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NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation · US EV Fleet Tracker

Active & Closed NHTSA EV Defect Investigations

Updated

Fleet-Wide Federal Probe Summary

11 open and 29 closed NHTSA defect investigations across 37 EV models

Every active Preliminary Evaluation (PE), Engineering Analysis (EA), Recall Query (RQ), Audit Query (AQ) and Defect Petition (DP) attached to 2020–2026 US battery electric vehicles in NHTSA’s ODI flat files through Nov 13, 2026. Active probes include EA26006 (Cadillac/Chevrolet), PE26006 (Tesla), PE26004 (Rivian), EA26002 (Tesla).

Data:NHTSA through

Open Probes

11

Active NHTSA ODI actions

Closed Probes

29

Historical EV actions

EV Models Covered

37

Across 18 makes

Total Tracked

40

Direct NHTSA ODI filings

Showing 40 of 40
Open Investigation EA26006 Engineering Analysis

Electronic Brake Module Component Failure

Opened: Aug 21, 2026
Status: Active

On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24011 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2023 MY Cadillac Lyriq vehicles. These complaints allege a hard brake pedal, followed by a “Brake System Failure” message at start up or while driving. GM shared records regarding several internal investigations for loss of brake assist due to alleged spindle fractures in the eBoost system. GM has stated that in the event of a spindle fracture, anti-lock brakes (ABS), stability control, and traction control remain functional until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. At this point, ABS, brake assist, stability control, and traction control functions are lost. The loss of these functions causes the vehicle to set one of three Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) based on failed performance criteria for the Electronic Brake Control Module (EBCM). These DTCs, in turn, activate several driver alerts: an audible chime, a visual “Service Brake System” message in the display, and multiple illuminated Malfunction Indicator Lights (MILs) for the ABS, Traction Control, and Brakes informing the driver of loss of functionality. The vehicle speed will also be limited to 70 KPH (43 MPH). Since opening PE24011, ODI has continued to receive reports of loss of brake assist. Some of these reports describe symptoms inconsistent with GM’s description of a spindle failure. These reports allege an immediate loss of brake assist functionality as opposed to the loss occurring after the vehicle comes to a complete stop. The sudden loss of brake assist during a braking event could result in extended braking distance, which increases the risk of a crash or injury. ODI believes further analysis is necessary to assess the potential for failures in GM’s eBoost system to resulting in safety-related outcomes. At this time, ODI is aware of the following vehicles that are equipped with this eBoost system: 2023-2026 MY Cadillac Lyriq, Chevrolet Colorado, and GMC Canyon; 2024-2026 MY Buick Enclave, Envision; Chevrolet Blazer EV, Equinox EV, Traverse; Cruise Origin; and GMC Acadia; 2025-2026 MY Cadillac Celestiq and Optiq. ODI is also aware of 2024-2026 MY Acura ZDX and 2024-2026 MY Honda Prologue vehicles that were built with this system. The Acura and Honda vehicles were manufactured by GM in a joint venture with Honda, and will be included in the Engineering Analysis as peer vehicles. ODI is opening this Engineering Analysis to further assess the safety-related consequences of a failed eBoost system. In addition, ODI is expanding the scope of the investigation to encompass all GM vehicles that share this eBoost system. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Component: SERVICE BRAKES
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation PE26006 Preliminary Evaluation

Lower Lateral Link detachment

Opened: Jul 29, 2026
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received 156 complaints alleging a suspension failure in model year (MY) 2018-2020 Model 3 and MY 2021-2023 Model Y vehicles. The suspension failure involves the detachment of the front lower lateral link, which potentially causes a loss of vehicle directional control. In most cases, there was no advance warning or indication that the suspension failure would occur.  Some cases cite noises occurring prior to failure, but note that the vehicle provides no visual warnings. Once the failure occurs, the vehicle may not be drivable, thus requiring a tow. Tesla has previously recalled vehicles for lateral link detachments through two recalls. Recall 21V-835 addressed 2,791 MY2019-2021 Tesla Model 3 vehicles due to a production issue. Recall 23V-235 addressed 422 2018-2019 Tesla Model 3 vehicles that had experienced similar failures to those recalled under 21V-835. The subject failures for this investigation exceed the scope of these recalls and do not appear to be related to the production issue that prompted those recalls. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation to determine the underlying cause, scope, and severity of the potential problem and to fully assess the potential safety-related issues. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Component: SUSPENSION:FRONT:CONTROL ARM:LOWER ARM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation PE26004 Preliminary Evaluation

Rear Toe Link May Separate

Opened: May 26, 2026
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received two Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting left rear toe link separation in certain Model Year (MY) 2023-2024 Rivian R1S vehicles. Both VOQs report component separation while driving, causing the vehicles to swerve across multiple lanes of traffic. One incident resulted in a collision with an adjacent vehicle and roadside barrier.  In both separations, the bolt that maintains the integrity of the toe link fractured. Evidence collected from the complaint vehicles included repair histories, onboard video, imagery of the damaged components, and a police accident report. The two vehicles with reported separation have different vehicle histories. One vehicle received prior service and the other was involved in a previous collision. In both instances, the vehicles operated for multiple months and thousands of miles of usage with no apparent problems between the previous service or the previous collision and the failures that prompted this investigation. Rivian recognized the subject toe link joint’s sensitivity to service procedures in March of 2025 in its updated service procedures. In January 2026 through recall 26V-003, Rivian extended the improved repair procedure to vehicles that received toe link service prior to the March 2025 improvement. ODI is opening a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to (1) assess the sensitivity of the rear toe link joint to foreseeable road and service conditions, (2) compare the physical failure evidence from the two VOQs to  identify apparent similarities and potential differences, (3) evaluate Rivian’s current toe link repair procedure, and (4) assess the in-field subject population’s toe links conditions. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov

Component: SUSPENSION:REAR
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation EA26002 Engineering Analysis

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

Opened: Mar 18, 2026
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening this Engineering Analysis to evaluate Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) degradation detection system. The focus of this investigation will be to assess the system’s ability, when encountering reduced roadway visibility conditions, to detect degradation and alert the driver with sufficient time to respond. ODI will evaluate the performance of FSD in degraded roadway conditions and the updates or modifications by Tesla to the degradation detection system, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of the updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI discussed individual incidents and its initial findings during the PE phase of its investigation with Tesla. As part of those discussions, Tesla’s post-incident analysis indicated that the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s degradation detection system, both as originally deployed and later updated, fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired camera visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. In upgrading PE24031 to an Engineering Analysis (EA), ODI will gather further information on the updated degradation detection system, including the status of updating vehicles and scope of compatible vehicles, the system’s visibility degradation detection capability, and alerts or warnings to the driver. Lastly, ODI will conduct analysis on six recent potentially related incidents. These incidents can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-11937, 13781-13211, 13781-13569, 13781-13633, 13781-13693, 13781-13788. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation PE25012 Preliminary Evaluation

Traffic safety violations while Full Self Driving ("FSD") is engaged

Opened: Oct 7, 2025
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope, frequency, and potential safety consequences of FSD executing driving maneuvers that constitute traffic safety violations. This investigation concerns versions of FSD that Tesla has labeled as "FSD (Supervised)" and "FSD (Beta)." Tesla characterizes FSD as an SAE Level 2 partial automation system requiring a fully attentive driver who is engaged in the driving task at all times. Level 2 partial automation systems are designed to support and assist the driver in performing certain aspects of the driving task, requiring a driver to supervise and intervene as necessary.  The driver remains fully responsible at all times for driving the vehicle, including complying with applicable traffic laws. ODI’s investigation will therefore focus, in particular, on whether certain driving inputs within the control authority of FSD forestall the driver’s supervision when they are unexpectedly performed. ODI has identified a number of incidents in which the inputs to the dynamic driving task commanded by FSD induced vehicle behavior that violated traffic safety laws. Although reports of this nature span a variety of behaviors, the reports appear to most commonly involve two types of scenarios. The first type of scenario involves a vehicle operating with FSD proceeding into an intersection in violation of a red traffic signal. The second type of scenario involves FSD commanding a lane change into an opposing lane of traffic. With respect to the first type of scenario, ODI has identified 18 complaints and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating at an intersection with FSD engaged, failed to remain stopped for the duration of a red traffic signal, failed to stop fully, or failed to accurately detect and display the correct traffic signal state in the vehicle interface. Some complainants also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior as the vehicle was approaching a red traffic signal. ODI has identified six Standing General Order ("SGO") reports in which a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, approached an intersection with a red traffic signal, continued to travel into the intersection against the red light and was subsequently involved in a crash with other motor vehicles in the intersection. Of these incidents, four crashes resulted in one or more reported injuries. At least some of the incidents appeared to involve FSD proceeding into the intersection after coming to a complete stop. ODI's pre-investigative work, including coordination with the Maryland Transportation Authority and State Police, indicated that the problem may be repeatable, given that multiple subject incidents occurred at the same intersection in Joppa, Maryland. NHTSA understands that Tesla has since taken action to address the issue at this intersection. With respect to the second type of scenario, ODI has identified 2 SGO reports, 18 complaints, and 2 media reports alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, entered opposing lanes of travel during or following a turn, crossed double-yellow lane markings while proceeding straight, or attempted to turn onto a road in the wrong direction despite the presence of wrong-way road signs. Likewise, ODI has identified 4 SGO reports, 6 complaints, and 1 media report alleging that a Tesla vehicle, operating with FSD engaged, proceeded straight through an intersection in a turn-only lane or executed a turn at an intersection in a through lane despite the presence of lane markings or signals. Complaints also alleged that FSD did not provide warnings of the system's intended behavior. Some complaints alleged that more than one of these failures occurred and, as such, the numbers are not cumulative. Some of the reported incidents appeared to involve FSD executing a lane change into an opposing lane of travel with little notice to a driver or opportunity to intervene. ODI’s review will assess whether there was prior warning or adequate time for the driver to respond to the unexpected behavior or to safely supervise the automated driving task. This review will assess any warnings to the driver about the system's impending behavior; the time given to drivers to respond; the capability of FSD to detect, display to the driver, and respond appropriately to traffic signals; and the capability of FSD to detect and respond to lane markings and wrong-way signage. NHTSA's review will also consider any updates or modifications to the system(s) that may affect the performance of FSD with respect to obeying traffic safety laws and signals. This assessment will focus, in particular, on the types of traffic safety violations described above, as most reports identified thus far have centered around those behaviors. While the behaviors under investigation appear to occur most frequently at intersections, NHTSA’s investigation will encompass any other types of situations in which this behavior may arise, such as when traveling adjacent to a lane of opposing traffic or when approaching railroad crossings. If other evidence received during this investigation involve other types of traffic safety violations, those may be considered as part of this assessment as well. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov. The SGO reports cited in this Resume are listed below by report ID and are available for download at NHTSA.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting. 13781-8739-1, 13781-8995-1, 13781-9623-1, 13781-10333-1, 13781-10872-1, 13781-10930-1, 13781-10939-1, 13781-10941-1, 13781-11069-1, 13781-11305-1, 13781-11579-1 Media reported allegations included as a separate attachment.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation PE25010 Preliminary Evaluation

Electronic door handles become inoperative

Opened: Sep 15, 2025
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has received nine Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting an inability to open doors on Model Year (MY) 2021 Tesla Model Y vehicles. The most commonly reported scenarios involved parents exiting the vehicle after a drive cycle in order to remove a child from the back seat or placing a child in the back seat before starting a drive cycle. In those events, the parents were unable to reopen a door to regain access to the vehicle. Four of these VOQs reported resorting to breaking a window to regain entry into the vehicle. Although Tesla vehicles have manual door releases inside of the cabin, in these situations, a child may not be able to access or operate the releases even if the vehicle’s driver is aware of them. As a result, in these instances, an occupant who remains inside a vehicle in this condition may be unable to be rapidly retrieved by persons outside of the vehicle. Entrapment in a vehicle is particularly concerning in emergency situations, such as when children are entrapped in a hot vehicle. For awareness, NHTSA has a Child Heatstroke Campaign that highlights the dangers to children entrapped in hot vehicles. Based on ODI’s preliminary review, this condition appears to occur when the electronic door locks receive insufficient voltage from the vehicle. Available repair invoices report replacement of the vehicle’s low voltage battery after the incident. However, no VOQs reported seeing a low voltage battery warning prior to the exterior door handles becoming inoperative. The Tesla Owner’s Manual “Jump Starting” and “Opening the Hood with No Power” sections describe a multi-step process for restoring power to the electronic door locks in order to enable their operation from outside of the vehicle. This process requires applying 12 volts DC from a separate power source to two different points accessible from the vehicle’s exterior.The subject incidents suggest that this process may not be readily available to owners or well known. For instances where an occupant is able to access and operate interior door handles, the Tesla Owner’s Manual “Opening Doors with No Power” section identifies the manual door releases inside of the vehicle’s cabin. ODI is opening this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) to assess the scope and severity of this condition, including the risks that arise from the conditions reported in the VOQs. This investigation will also assess the approach used by Tesla to supply power to the door locks and the reliability of the applicable power supplies. At this time, NHTSA’s investigation is focused on the operability of the electronic door locks from outside of the vehicle as that circumstance is the only one in which there is no manual way to open the door. The agency will continue to monitor any reports of entrapment involving opening doors from inside of the vehicle, and ODI will take further action as needed. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume and the ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Tesla Model Y 2021
Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:12V/24V/48V BATTERY
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation AQ25002 Audit Query

Compliance with Standing General Order 2021-01 Reporting Requirements

Opened: Aug 20, 2025
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (“ODI”) has identified numerous incident reports submitted by Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) in response to Standing General Order 2021-01 (the “SGO”), in which the reported crashes occurred several months or more before the dates of the reports. The majority of these reports involved crashes in which the Standing General Order in place at the time required a report to be submitted within one or five days of Tesla receiving notice of the crash. When the reports were submitted, Tesla submitted them in one of two ways. Many of the reports were submitted as part of a single batch, while others were submitted on a rolling basis. Preliminary engagement between ODI and Tesla on the issue indicates that the timing of the reports was due to an issue with Tesla’s data collection, which, according to Tesla, has now been fixed. NHTSA is opening this Audit Query, a standard process for reviewing compliance with legal requirements, to evaluate the cause of the potential delays in reporting, the scope of any such delays, and the mitigations that Tesla has developed to address them. As part of this review, NHTSA will assess whether any reports of prior incidents remain outstanding and whether the reports that were submitted include all of the required and available data. The SGO reports cited in the Opening Resume, can be found at NHTSA.gov/SGOCrashReporting under the following SGO 2021-01 report IDs: 13781-11020-1 13781-10844-1 13781-10843-1 13781-10530-1 13781-10160-1 13781-10159-1 13781-10157-1 13781-10146-1 13781-10122-1 13781-10098-1 13781-10097-1 13781-10096-1 13781-10095-1 13781-10094-1 13781-10093-1 13781-10023-1 13781-10022-1 13781-10021-1 13781-10020-1 13781-10017-1 13781-10016-1 13781-10015-1 13781-10014-1 13781-10013-1 13781-10012-1 13781-6047-1 13781-9930-1 13781-9917-1 13781-9928-1 13781-9925-1 13781-9924-1 13781-9923-1 13781-9922-1 13781-9835-1 13781-9834-1 13781-9833-1 13781-9832-1 13781-9831-1 13781-9830-1 13781-9829-1 13781-9827-1 13781-9818-1 13781-9780-1 13781-9779-1 13781-9778-1 13781-9777-1 13781-9775-1 13781-9774-1 13781-9773-1 13781-9772-1 13781-9771-1 13781-9770-1 13781-9728-1 13781-9688-1 13781-9715-1 13781-9714-1 13781-9713-1 13781-9712-1 13781-9711-1 13781-9710-1 13781-9709-1 13781-9696-1 13781-9695-1 13781-9694-1 13781-9693-1 13781-9692-1 13781-9691-1 13781-9690-1 13781-9687-1 13781-9686-1 13781-9342-1 13781-9319-1 13781-9019-1 13781-8910-1 13781-8732-1 13781-8712-1 13781-8310-1 13781-7897-1 13781-7895-1 13781-7835-1 13781-7798-1 13781-7797-1 13781-7758-1 13781-7757-1 13781-7756-1 13781-7755-1 13781-7667-1 13781-7399-1 13781-7398-1 13781-7397-1 13781-7396-1 13781-7395-1 13781-7394-1 13781-7393-1 13781-7389-1 13781-7388-1 13781-7387-1 13781-7386-1 13781-7385-1 13781-7383-1 13781-7187-1 13781-7186-1 13781-7185-1 13781-7184-1 13781-7181-1 13781-7023-1 13781-6399-1 13781-6389-1 13781-6388-1 13781-6387-1 13781-6386-1 13781-6379-1 13781-6378-1 13781-6377-1 13781-6375-1 13781-6214-1 13781-6172-1 13781-6155-1 13781-6154-1 13781-6122-1 13781-6120-1 13781-6118-1 13781-5800-1

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation EA25001 Engineering Analysis

Collisions Involving Ford BlueCruise

Opened: Jan 17, 2025
Status: Active

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Engineering Analysis (EA) is being opened to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation RQ24009 Recall Query

Recall 23V838 Remedy Effectiveness

Opened: Apr 25, 2024
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is opening a Recall Query to assess the remedy adequacy of Recall 23V838. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system, which Tesla described as an SAE Level 2 (L2) Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS). Autopilot is the simultaneous engagement of Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. In describing the safety defect, Tesla’s Defect Information Report (DIR) explained that “the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse,” and Tesla committed to the deployment of a multipart remedy aimed at improving system and engagement controls and reducing mode confusion. EA22002 (upgraded from PE21020) was opened to investigate whether Tesla’s Autopilot contained a defect that created an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety and involved extensive crash analysis, human factors analysis, vehicle evaluations, and assessment of vehicle control authority and driver engagement technologies. The work conducted in these investigations aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its 23V838 recall filing. During EA22002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. Tesla filed Recall 23V838 to address concerns regarding the Autopilot system investigated in EA22002. Following deployment of the remedy in Recall 23V838, ODI identified concerns due to post-remedy crash events and results from preliminary NHTSA tests of remedied vehicles. Also, Tesla has stated that a portion of the remedy both requires the owner to opt in and allows a driver to readily reverse it. Tesla has also deployed non-remedy updates to address issues that appear related to ODI’s concerns under EA22002. This investigation will consider why these updates were not a part of the recall or otherwise determined to remedy a defect that poses an unreasonable safety risk. ODI is therefore opening this Recall Query investigation to further evaluate the adequacy of the remedy for recall 23V838.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS:DRIVER MONITORING:SOFTWARE
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation AQ24004 Audit Query

High Voltage Coolant Heaters may fail to defrost windshield

Opened: Apr 3, 2024
Status: Active

In a Part 573 Report dated July 27, 2023, Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (JLR) notified NHTSA of a safety-related defect in 2021-2022 Jaguar I-Pace vehicles. This filing was assigned Recall No. 23V-518. JLR noted that the subject vehicles are equipped with High Voltage Coolant Heaters (HVCH), supplied by Webasto Group (Webasto), that can develop cracking and delamination of the heating element, leading to an inability to defrost the front windshield, which may increase the risk of a crash. In a Part 573 Report dated January 11, 2024, Lucid USA, Inc. (Lucid) notified NHTSA of a safety-related defect in 2022-2023 Lucid Air vehicles. This filing was assigned Recall No. 24V-011. Lucid noted the subject vehicles are equipped with HVCH, supplied by Webasto, that can delaminate, leading to an inability to defrost the front windshield, which may increase the risk of a crash. The purpose of this Audit Query (AQ) is to: 1. Obtain a complete list of purchasers and the quantities for which the same or similar HVCH were supplied; 2. Obtain copies of all written communications initiated by Webasto and sent to its purchasers regarding the subject equipment; and 3. Request Webasto, per 49 CFR 573.3(f), submit a requisite Part 573 Recall Report for defective HVCH installed into motor vehicles of multiple vehicle manufacturers.

Component: VISIBILITY:DEFROSTER/DEFOGGER/HVAC SYSTEM:WINDSHIELD:ELECTRICAL HEATING ELEMENT
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Open Investigation DP23002 Defect Petition

Sudden Unintended Acceleration

Opened: Jun 29, 2023
Status: Active

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting that ODI reevaluate its decision to deny DP20-001 on the basis that intermittent high electrical current demands on the vehicles' 12VDC systems may have caused some or all of the incidents examined by ODI in DP20-001. The petitioner bases this information on a review of open-source research and the DP20-001 denial. The petition and related materials can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under the following ODI number: 11528471.

Component: VEHICLE SPEED CONTROL
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed DP25002 Defect Petition

Emergency egress controls are not readily accessible and clearly identifiable.

Opened: Dec 23, 2025
Closed: Jul 22, 2026

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has completed its review of a defect petition received on November 24, 2025, requesting an investigation into the emergency mechanical door release in 2022 Model Year (MY) Tesla Model 3.  The petition alleges that the controls for the emergency mechanical door release are not accessible and clearly identifiable and thus fail to comply with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206. A vehicle equipped with electric door handles without an accessible mechanical door release creates a risk to safety when the electric door handle becomes inoperative due to loss of power and occupants are unable to easily locate the mechanical door release to exit the vehicle in case of an emergency. A concealed or hard to locate emergency door release could prevent an operator or occupant from exiting the vehicle in the event of an emergency, such as a crash or fire. The potential risk for entrapment can result in a severe injury or death of the operator and other occupants of the vehicle. As of March 13, 2026, out of the population of 179,031 subject vehicles, NHTSA has identified one (1) consumer complaint, in NHTSA’s databases alleging that the mechanical door release is concealed and unlabeled, resulting in a risk of entrapment in the event of an emergency, as cited in the Petition.  The complaint is for the same Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) as the subject vehicle of the Petition. The allegation describes a front impact collision, where the vehicle lost electrical power, and the electric door mechanism stopped working. The 2022 MY Model 3 has a mechanical release for the front doors, located in front of the window switch on the door's interior and consists of a lever that can be pulled up to open the door. The subject vehicle does not have a mechanical release for the back doors. The owner’s manual for the 2022 MY Tesla Model 3 includes a section labeled “In Case of Emergency” that details how to open doors from the interior when the vehicle has no electrical power. The owner’s manual refers to the mechanical release as a “manual door release.” The owner’s manual instructs the operator to “pull up the manual door release located in front of the window switches.” The owner’s manual includes an illustration showing the mechanical door release lever and its location on the door. The illustration depicts an image of the door with the window switch and lever, including a blue arrow pointing to the location of the lever to demonstrate the upward movement required to operate the lever.  The lever shown in the illustration does not contain a label to identify it.   Although they vary in design and location, mechanical releases for the front doors are available on all Tesla models. The location and operation of the mechanical release is described in the owner’s manual for each Tesla model. Further, the owner’s manual cautions the operator that the mechanical door release should only be used when the subject vehicle has no power or if otherwise necessary. If the subject vehicle has power, the button located at the top of the interior door handle should be used to open the doors. The Petition also stated the lack of an accessible mechanical emergency door release is a violation of the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 206 (49 CFR § 571.206). FMVSS 206 specifies performance requirements for vehicle door locks, latches, hinges, and attachment components to prevent passenger ejection during crashes. It applies to passenger cars, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000 lbs.) or less, focusing on maintaining latch engagement under inertial loads and structural integrity. No requirements exist in the standard that address the Petitioner’s concern regarding the labeling and location of an emergency mechanical door release in passenger cars. On November 4, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Rulemaking received a petition to initiate the issuance of a new Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) to mandate a robust and obvious door egress system in all motor vehicles. The request has been granted, and the Agency will accordingly commence a rulemaking proceeding. See 49 CFR § 552.9. A decision as to the issuance of a rule will be made on the basis of all available information developed in the course of the rulemaking proceeding, in accordance with statutory criteria. Id. The Agency has thoroughly assessed the material submitted by the Petitioner, consumer complaint information in NHTSA’s databases, and other relevant information already in possession of the Agency. NHTSA does not believe that the issues presented by the Petitioner indicate the likelihood of a safety related defect that would warrant a defect investigation, and the issue is best addressed through the rulemaking process. After full consideration of the available information and the commencement of the related rulemaking proceeding, the Petition is denied. Further specifics can be found in the Federal Register Notice. The ODI report cited above can be viewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11701894 and the Defect Petition can be viewed under ODI Number 11698174.

Affected EVs: Tesla Model 3 2022
Component: STRUCTURE:BODY:DOOR:HANDLE:INTERIOR
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed RQ25004 Recall Query

Loss of rear-view camera image

Opened: Jul 9, 2025
Closed: Aug 28, 2026

On July 9, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Recall Query (RQ) 25004 to investigate and review the effectiveness of the remedy for Recall 25V-280.Polestar initiated Recall 25V-280 to address shortcomings in the remedy for Recall 24V-477, which intended to address rear camera outage conditions. Consumer complaint traffic reporting rear-view camera outages after receiving the remedy for 25V-280prompted the RQ opening. On July 7, 2024, Polestar initiated Recall 24V-477 to address issues with the rear-view camera display in certain Model Year (MY) 2021-2024 Polestar 2 vehicles. According to Polestar, this failure was due to a memory allocation error in the IHU. To address this error, the remedy, provided by an over-the-air (OTA) software update , shortened the retry times of the camera streams and removed the rendering of the map in the driver display during backing events to release the graphic memory for the rear-view camera. On April 25, 2025, Polestar initiated Recall 25V-280 to address similar issues with the rear-view camera display in certain MY 2021-2025 Polestar 2 vehicles. The recall remedy consisted of an OTA software update intended to correct a synchronization error between the Parking Assist Camera (PAC) and the Infotainment Head Unit (IHU). The updated software would maintain the high-speed signal connection between the PAC and IHU, instead of toggling on and off by request. ODI has received two hundred seventy-five (275) Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQ) alleging failure of the rear-view camera to display after receiving the remedy for Recall 25V-280. Consumers reported that the rear-view camera failed to display once the vehicle was initially placed in reverse, as well as losing the rear-view image while the vehicle was traveling in reverse . Failure to display the rearview image will reduce the driver’s visibility in a backing event, increasing the risk of a crash. On July 18, 2025, ODI sent Polestar an Information Request (IR) letter requesting data for vehicle production, field incidents, and any modifications related to the backup camera and its software. ODI also requested information pertaining to Polestar’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. On September 15, 2025, Polestar issued Recall 25V-615, which sought to remedy the failure of Recall 25V-280. Polestar acknowledged that the prior remedy was insufficient and that further engineering analysis would be required for final software development and validation. Polestar worked with its supplier (Volvo) and began validation of the new software in February 2026. On April 20, 2026, Polestar released the remedy for Recall 25V-615 via an OTA software update. The update provided general stability improvements to the operating system, as well as bug fixes for the rear-view camera. Since the deployment of the 25V-615 remedy, ODI has received only 3 VOQs alleging a rear camera outage, yielding a complaint rate of 0.01% for Recall 25V-615. ODI assessed the conditions that led to the 25V-280 remedy failures and the countermeasures deployed to prevent recurrence in vehicles that received the remedy for 25V-615. To measure its efficacy, ODI analyzed materials produced by Polestar in its responses to ODI’s July 18, 2025, IR letter and additional materials Polestar furnished in response to email requests and a technical meeting in 2026.ODI also reviewed information Polestar provided in response to another IR letter NHTSA sent on March 25, 2026, requesting additional information related to the decision-making process for correcting the remedy failure of Recall 25V-280. On June 10, 2026, at the request of ODI, Polestar presented a technical briefing of the remedy for Recall 25V-615, which included both completion rates and remedy failure counts. ODI has monitored the remedy for Recall 25V-615 since April 2026 and has observed the failure rate to remain low. ODI is closing this RQ following manufacturer action in the form of Recall 25V-615. The Agency will continue to monitor the remedy and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 25V615000 Component: BACK OVER PREVENTION: SENSING SYSTEM: CAMERA
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE25004 Preliminary Evaluation

Windshield Wiper Failure

Opened: Apr 29, 2025
Closed: Mar 11, 2026

On April 29, 2025, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE25004) to investigate inoperative windshield wipers in model year (MY) 2024-2025 Kia EV9 vehicles. The complaints report windshield wipers that malfunction while driving, when snow and/or ice accumulates on or at the bottom of the windshield or in the cowl. ODI further received videos and photographs that depict relatively small amounts of snow and/or ice accumulation that leads to the wipers’ malfunction. Inoperative windshield wipers could reduce driver visibility during inclement weather and increase the risk of a crash. ODI identified 7 Vehicle Owners Questionnaires (VOQs) related to this investigation. Five VOQs describe inoperative windshield wipers due to snow and/or ice accumulation. Two other VOQs describe other malfunctioning windshield wipers including snow build-up on the blades and an odor of overheating. The wipers are equipped with thermal overload protection designed to limit overheating of the wiper motor. Further, consumers describe windshield wipers that temporarily stop working when they are not able to clear the windshield. This may happen when the wipers stop before the parked position in the cowl at the bottom of the windshield. In January 2026, Kia informed ODI that it will conduct a Product Improvement Campaign with owner notification for approximately 47,000 MY 2024-2026EV9 vehicles.The campaign includes a hardware change to the passenger-side wiper arm and an Owner’s Manual revision. The replacement wiper arm will be a different shape and angle that increase the space/clearance between the cowl and the wiper. The Owner’s Manual revision will emphasize the importance of snow removal prior to driving, and it will recommend that drivers place the wipers in service mode when the vehicle is parked outdoors, and snow is forecasted. In addition, Kia is planning to develop pop-up cluster warnings that will be temperature-dependent, and they will remind owners to clear snow/ice pre-drive and to place the wipers in service mode post-drive. In view of Kia’s field action, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. ODI will take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Kia EV9 2024–2025
Component: VISIBILITY:WINDSHIELD WIPER/WASHER
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24033 Preliminary Evaluation

Actually Smart Summon sessions resulting in low-speed impacts.

Opened: Jan 6, 2025
Closed: Apr 3, 2026

On January 6, 2025, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation 24003 (PE24033) to investigate Actually Smart Summon (Summon) sessions resulting in crashes during active sessions. According to Tesla, Summon is a short-distance SAE Level 2 system, controlled by the user from a cell phone within a certain distance and intended for use in parking lots and on private property. ODI analyzed complaint data provided by Tesla as well as complaints submitted to ODI from consumers to identify Summon incidents resulting in crashes. ODI's analysis indicates that almost all Summon reported crashes involved minor property damage claims with no reported incidents involving a vulnerable road user, injury, fatality, or major property damage as indicated by an air bag deployment or vehicle tow away. Out of millions of Summon sessions, a fraction of 1% resulted in an incident. Almost all those incidents took place where, typically early in a Summon session, the system or person using the app failed to fully detect or respond appropriately to vehicle surroundings resulting in minor impacts. Incidents took place when app users did not have a complete 360-degree view of the surroundings in the app to assess situational awareness. This limited the app user’s ability to determine whether an impact was imminent during initial vehicle maneuvers such as reversing in close proximity to an obstacle or a curb. ODI found that the impacts most often occurred with parking gates, adjacently parked vehicles, and short parking bollards. During this investigation, ODI identified two Summon crashes related to camera blockages. In both crashes, Summon attempted to navigate a snowy parking lot with snow partially or fully obstructing the forward-facing cameras. Summon did not detect the camera blockage and the vehicles collided with unoccupied parked vehicles while navigating the parking lot. App users in both instances did not command a vehicle stop or pause despite the obstructed camera visible in the camera stream in the app. On January 15, 2025, Tesla released Over-the-Air (OTA) Software (SW) Update Action numbers 578998 and 579185 for vehicles in service to implement a camera blockage detection condition. Both OTAs improve camera blockage detection mechanisms. Additionally, on January 20, 2025, and January 30, 2025, Tesla identified additional system requirements associated with camera visibility checks and released OTA SW-578752 and SW-580322, respectively. These firmware updates reduce false negative camera blockage detections due to snow or condensation. In its investigation, ODI identified one Summon incident where the vehicle did not yield for a gate arm blocking a garage exit lane and the app user did not command a vehicle stop or pause, resulting in an impact. On February 6, 2025, Tesla deployed OTA SW-578839 to improve vehicle reaction to dynamic gates. This OTA update upgraded vehicle perception systems through a high-fidelity occupancy determination network, which uses data from vehicle sensory systems to improve reconstruction of field objects with high accuracy. On November 20, 2025, Tesla further improved vehicle performance by adding object detections from a separate neural network through OTA SW-580514. Owners of the affected vehicles received all six OTA SW updates. Tesla also released these SW updates to production vehicles. See online public file for detailed descriptions of all six OTA SW updates. Due to low incident occurrence and low incident severity, this preliminary evaluation is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding that a safety-related defect does not exist. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. For additional information regarding this investigation, see the complete online public file.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS:AUTONOMOUS/SELF DRIVING
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24031 Preliminary Evaluation

FSD Collisions in Reduced Roadway Visibility Conditions

Opened: Oct 17, 2024
Closed: Mar 18, 2026

On October 17, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24031) of Tesla’s Full Self Driving Beta and Full Self Driving (Supervised) (collectively, FSD) to assess: the ability of the FSD system to detect and respond appropriately to reduced roadway visibility conditions; whether any other FSD crashes had occurred under degraded roadway visibility conditions that are similar in nature to the four SGO-reported crashes identified in the opening document, and if so, the contributing circumstances for each of those crashes; and any updates or modifications by Tesla to the FSD system that may affect the performance of FSD in degraded roadway visibility conditions, including the timing, purpose, and capabilities of any such updates, and Tesla’s assessment of their safety impact. Tesla’s FSD is an advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) that relies exclusively on vision-based cameras and the related FSD software to detect and respond to the roadway ahead, projecting a path forward based on traffic control devices, vehicles, pedestrians, and the roadway itself. During this phase of the investigation, ODI reviewed the materials provided by Tesla detailing any actions taken, or changes, modifications, and updates made that may relate to the alleged defect. ODI reviewed information related to Tesla’s transition to a vision-only perception system, and its deployment of the strategy in vehicles. ODI’s findings include information on limitations of the vision-only perception system and updates made in response to known subject crashes. When Tesla began transitioning away from using both cameras and radars to an exclusively camera-based approach, known as Tesla Vision, in mid-2021, it developed and implemented a degradation detection system that it deployed by a software update to existing and new Tesla vehicles. On June 28, 2024, the day after Tesla submitted the SGO report of the November 28, 2023 fatal crash listed in this document, Tesla began developing an update to the degradation detection system. ODI reviewed certain public statements, including those made during an April 2025 earnings call, in which Tesla stated that it had developed a breakthrough “direct photon-counting” capability that eliminates the degradation that the camera-based system experiences when glare is encountered. At this time, ODI does not have information on when the update was deployed and which vehicles have the updated system. ODI has discussed individual incidents and its initial findings with Tesla. Based on Tesla’s post-incident analysis, the update to the degradation detection system, had it been installed on the vehicles at the time, may have affected 3 of the 9 incidents identified by ODI. Review of Tesla’s responses revealed additional crashes that occurred in similar environments and where the system either did not detect a degraded state, and/or it did not present the driver with an alert with adequate time for the driver to react. In each of these crashes, FSD also lost track of or never detected a lead vehicle in its path. Tesla also described internal data and labeling limitations that prevented a uniform identification and analysis of crash events with the subject system engaged. ODI believes this limitation could have led to under-reporting of subject crashes over portions of the defined time-period. Available incident data raise concerns that Tesla’s FSD system fails to detect and/or warn the driver appropriately under degraded visibility conditions such as glare and airborne obscurants where the camera-based system performance degrades significantly. In the crashes that ODI has reviewed, the FSD system did not detect common roadway conditions that impaired its visibility and/or provide alerts when camera performance had deteriorated until immediately before the crash occurred. ODI is upgrading this investigation (PE24031) to Engineering Analysis (EA) 26002 to further evaluate this matter. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 13781-8004, 13781-7181, 13781-7381, 13781-7767, 13781-7964, 13781-8977, 13781-9267.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24028 Preliminary Evaluation

Electrical arcing and thermal events, potentially leading to fires, while utilizing Enel X Way USA, LLC's JuiceBox residential charger.

Opened: Oct 3, 2024
Closed: Jun 5, 2025

On October 3, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened PE24028 to investigate alleged failures of Enel X Way's JuiceBox Level 2 residential EV chargers. The allegations were described as thermal incidents and electrical malfunctions, which could trip the circuit breakers in Juicebox owners’ homes and disrupt electric vehicle charge cycles. On October 2, 2024, Enel X Way posted on its website that Enel X Way North America would cease operations in the United States and Canada on October 11, 2024. The closure would potentially impact the charging app and supporting software. ODI sent Enel X Way an Information Request (IR) letter on October 21, 2024. Enel X Way provided an incomplete response to the IR on December 9, 2024. Enel X Way later provided a complete response to the IR on January 24, 2025. ODI reviewed Enel X Way’s IR submissions to determine whether further action is required. Based on ODI’s analysis, there was no clear trend in the cause of the failures described in customer complaints and warranty reports. Additionally, there have been no recent reports alleging safety issues. The available information does not warrant further action at this time. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency will continue to monitor for any safety trends and reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in this Closing Resume, go to NHTSA.gov.

Component: EQUIPMENT:ELECTRICAL
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed RQ24010 Recall Query

Inadvertent Door Opening

Opened: May 16, 2024
Closed: Nov 4, 2024

On May 16, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened Recall Query (RQ) RQ24010 to investigate the remedy and scope of recalls 23V-213 and 23V-312. The affected vehicles by these recalls included model years (MY) 2021 through 2023 Volkswagen ID.4 vehicles. ODI received reports of the vehicle’s doors opening while the vehicle was in motion post recall remedy.  ODI, also, received similar allegations on vehicles that were outside the scope of the recalls. Volkswagen issued recall 23V-213 on March 29, 2023, and recall 23V-213 on May 03, 2023. These recalls addressed the defect of water ingress into the circuit board assembly of the door handle. Water ingress can cause communication issues between the door handle and the door control until. This malfunction resulted in the vehicle door inadvertently opening while the vehicle was in motion. Over the course of the investigation, ODI received 17 unique VIN VOQ complaints of the vehicle doors opening while the vehicle was in motion occurring either post recall remedy or on a vehicle that was outside the recall scope. Volkswagen submitted 190 unique VIN complaints reporting the same circumstances. On September 4, 2024, Volkswagen submitted recall 24V-651 to address the issue of inadvertent opening of the door while the vehicle is in motion. The scope of this recall expands the affected vehicles to include all MY2021-2024 Volkswagen ID.4 models, including those remedied under the subject recalls. The recall remedy consists of replacement of the door handle assembly on all four doors as well as a software update.  The software update is performed to update the door handle parameters. The new door handle will have the membrane relocated to the back of the handle to avoid standing water within the handle.  Also, a protective coating will be on the front and back of the circuit board to avoid direct moisture formation. In view of the action being taken by Volkswagen, Recall 24V-651, ODI is closing this Recall Query.  The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Component: LATCHES/LOCKS/LINKAGES:DOORS:LATCH
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24013 Preliminary Evaluation

Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking

Opened: May 8, 2024
Closed: Jan 16, 2025

On May 8, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24013 to investigate reports of inadvertent activation of the automatic emergency braking (AEB) system in model year (MY) 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles manufactured by Fisker Group Inc. (Fisker). The complaints allege the activation of AEB without an apparent roadway obstruction in the vehicle’s forward path, resulting in sudden vehicle deceleration. This sudden deceleration occurs without adequate warning or input from the driver. The braking applications range from momentary, partial application resulting in rapid loss of speed to full application, which brings the vehicle to a complete stop in the travel lane. ODI sent Fisker an Information Request (IR) letter on May 20, 2024. On June 17 and 19, 2024, Fisker and its affiliates filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Fisker provided an incomplete response to the IR on July 1, 2024. Limited information pertaining to system validation and failure data was provided. Fisker subsequently requested more time to provide additional responsive files due to limited available resources. Fisker sent additional responsive files on September 9, 2024, September 17, 2024, and December 16, 2024, but Fisker’s response did not contain sufficient information for ODI to fully evaluate the alleged safety defect. Further, on December 27, 2024, the Fisker employees with whom ODI had been corresponding informed ODI that all Fisker employees were being “dismissed” as of that date. ODI therefore does not anticipate receiving any further responsive submissions such that it can fully evaluate the reports that led to this investigation. ODI performed phone interviews and sent a survey to consumers to obtain more information and validate the allegations. Additionally, ODI reviewed allegations of the alleged safety defect that were submitted to various online forums. Most of these reports were similar in nature to the reports received by ODI. Some of the reports in online forums appear to be duplicative reports that were also submitted to ODI. Based on the responses received and analysis of similar online reporting, there was no clear trend in the following factors pertaining to the allegations: reoccurrence of events (i.e., single or multiple incidents), speed immediately prior to the event, whether the event concluded in a reduction of speed or a full stop, roadway conditions, and warning immediately prior to the event. To date, between the reports provided by Fisker and complaints made directly to the agency, ODI is aware of over 20 reports alleging inadvertent AEB activation. Before the employees were dismissed, Fisker’s testing done in response to the inadvertent AEB allegations reportedly did not result in any inadvertent AEB activations. The “Manufacturer” and “Total” counts in the above table have been left blank because of a pending request for confidential treatment by Fisker that could not be timely addressed given the company’s status. This information factored into ODI’s investigation and analysis. The available information does not warrant further action at this time.  The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. Additionally, the Agency notes that the Vehicle Safety Act states: “A manufacturer’s filing of a petition in bankruptcy under chapter 7 or chapter 11 of title 11 does not negate the manufacturer’s duty to comply with section 30112 or sections 30115 through 30120 of this title,” which include the recall provisions of the Act. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Fisker Ocean 2023
Component: FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY BRAKING
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24012 Preliminary Evaluation

Collisions Involving Ford BlueCruise

Opened: Apr 25, 2024
Closed: Jan 17, 2025

On April 25, 2024, NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE24012) to assess BlueCruise, a partial driving automation system available on certain vehicles manufactured by Ford Motor Company (Ford). NHTSA opened the investigation after the agency received notice of two fatal collisions involving BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles. Based on the incidents, NHTSA scoped the investigation to 2021-2024 Mustang Mach-E vehicles equipped with BlueCruise. In June 2024, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Ford requiring that it provide certain information pertaining to crashes, non-crash reports, and technical specifications that relate to BlueCruise, as well as other Ford partial driving automation systems that offer lane and speed maintenance. In its response to ODI’s IR, Ford stated that there are 2,539,962 Ford and Lincoln vehicles (including subject and peer vehicles) equipped with a partial driving automation system within the scope of the request. The majority of these vehicles are equipped with a system that Ford calls Lane Centering Assist (LCA), which is a hands-on partial driving automation system that combines longitudinal control authority governed by Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and lateral control authority governed by a steerable path. LCA is offered on a wide range of Ford and Lincoln models beginning in model year 2019. Vehicles that are equipped with BlueCruise, the focus of this investigation, have LCA capability and additionally offer hands-free partial driving automation when certain conditions are met. Hands-free BlueCruise operation is only offered on certain roadways and system availability is geofenced using vehicle GPS. BlueCruise-equipped vehicles employ a camera-based driver monitoring system to determine driver attentiveness to the roadway. BlueCruise was introduced in model year 2021 and is currently available in a select range of Ford and Lincoln vehicles. For BlueCruise- and LCA-equipped vehicles, both ACC and Pre-Collision Assist (PCA) features use a combination of camera and radar sensing technologies to detect and classify objects. ACC is specifically designed to detect vehicles (including cars, trucks, and motorcycles) and bicycles in front of the subject vehicle which are either stationary or moving in the same direction as the subject vehicle. Through this investigation, limitations in the detection of stationary vehicles in certain conditions have been identified. Specifically, due to the potential for false detection of stationary objects at long distances, Ford designed ACC to inhibit any response to reported stationary objects when the subject vehicle’s approach speed is at or above 62 mph. Additionally, system performance may be limited when there is poor visibility due to insufficient illumination. In addition to reviewing Ford’s response to ODI’s IR, the agency conducted a review of crash and non-crash reports identified collectively through Ford’s IR response, incident reporting through Standing General Order 2021-01 (SGO), and NHTSA vehicle owner questionnaires. In total, 32 crashes and 2,004 non-crash reports on subject and peer Ford vehicles were identified across manufacturer and ODI data sources. A detailed analysis of each crash was conducted including the review of any available police reports, photographs, data recovered from in-vehicle event data recorders, connected vehicle data, and/or other information. In both fatal collisions referenced in the PE24012 opening resume, the subject Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicle was traveling over 70 mph on a controlled-access highway during nighttime lighting conditions with hands-free BlueCruise engaged when it collided with a stationary vehicle. Analysis of data imaged from the vehicles’ event data recorders demonstrates that in each incident, the driver did not apply the brakes or take evasive steering action, and no deceleration was initiated by either the BlueCruise system or PCA prior to impact. Through the agency’s crash analysis, four additional frontal collisions were identified where the subject Ford impacted a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle or another stationary object located in the travel lane. Two of these four incidents involved BlueCruise-equipped Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (included in the failure report summary along with the fatal collisions discussed above), while the other two involved other Ford models equipped with the LCA system. Additionally, a trend was identified through analysis of the non-crash reports relating to allegations that ACC (the longitudinal component of both BlueCruise and LCA) failed to detect and/or respond to a stopped or slow-moving lead vehicle. In these reports, consumers often describe that the absence of deceleration initiated by ACC was unexpected and required harsh manual braking or intervention from the PCA to avoid a frontal collision with the lead vehicle. Based on NHTSA’s analysis, system limitations relating to the detection of stationary vehicles while traveling at highway speeds and in nighttime lighting conditions appear to be factors in collisions under investigation and several apparently similar near-miss, non-crash reports. This Preliminary Evaluation is being upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA25001) to further investigate these system limitations and to evaluate drivers’ ability to respond to scenarios that exceed system limitations. During the EA, the agency expects to, among other things, perform vehicle evaluations, review additional technical information, and perform additional analysis of related crashes and non-crash reports. The crashes included in the failure report summary can be found at NHTSA.gov under the following SGO report identification numbers: 502-7268, 502-7426, 502-6852, 502-8738.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24011 Preliminary Evaluation

Electronic Brake Module Component Failure

Opened: Apr 11, 2024
Closed: Aug 21, 2026

On April 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation PE24011 after receiving complaints concerning a loss of brake assist in 2023 MY Cadillac Lyriq vehicles. These complaints allege a hard brake pedal, followed by a “Brake System Failure” message at start up or while driving. GM shared records regarding several internal investigations for loss of brake assist due to alleged spindle fractures in the eBoost system. GM has stated that in the event of a spindle fracture, anti-lock brakes (ABS), stability control, and traction control remain functional until the vehicle comes to a complete stop. At this point, ABS, brake assist, stability control, and traction control functions are lost. The loss of these functions causes the vehicle to set one of three Diagnostic Trouble Codes (DTCs) based on failed performance criteria for the Electronic Brake Control Module (EBCM). These DTCs, in turn, activate several driver alerts: an audible chime, a visual “Service Brake System” message in the display, and multiple illuminated Malfunction Indicator Lights (MILs) for the ABS, Traction Control, and Brakes informing the driver of loss of functionality. The vehicle speed will also be limited to 70 KPH (43 MPH). Since opening PE24011, ODI has continued to receive reports of loss of brake assist. Some of these reports describe symptoms inconsistent with GM’s description of a spindle failure. These reports allege an immediate loss of brake assist functionality as opposed to the loss occurring after the vehicle comes to a complete stop. The sudden loss of brake assist during a braking event could result in extended braking distance, which increases the risk of a crash or injury. ODI believes further analysis is necessary to assess the potential for failures in GM’s eBoost system to resulting in safety-related outcomes. At this time, ODI is aware of the following vehicles that are equipped with this eBoost system: 2023-2026 MY Cadillac Lyriq, Chevrolet Colorado, and GMC Canyon; 2024-2026 MY Buick Enclave, Envision; Chevrolet Blazer EV, Equinox EV, Traverse; Cruise Origin; and GMC Acadia; 2025-2026 MY Cadillac Celestiq and Optiq. ODI is also aware of 2024-2026 MY Acura ZDX and 2024-2026 MY Honda Prologue vehicles that were built with this system. The Acura and Honda vehicles were manufactured by GM in a joint venture with Honda, and will be included in the Engineering Analysis as peer vehicles. ODI is upgrading this Preliminary Evaluation to an Engineering Analysis, EA26006, to gain further understanding ofthe safety-related consequences of a failed eBoost system. In addition, ODI is expanding the scope of the investigation to encompass all GM vehicles that share this eBoost system. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Cadillac LYRIQ 2023
Component: SERVICE BRAKES
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24010 Preliminary Evaluation

Failure to open door

Opened: Apr 1, 2024
Closed: Aug 26, 2024

On April 1, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24010 to investigate instances of failure to open the door in model year (MY) 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles manufactured by Fisker Group Inc. Some complaints allege the inability to open the door from either the interior or exterior door handle, resulting in the need to use another door to egress. The investigation revealed that all four exterior door handles are subject to sticking in the extended/unlocked position, which may result in the inability to unlatch the door from either the interior or exterior door handle. The root cause is a dimensional interference between the exterior door handle chassis pocket and door handle, causing friction during handle deployment and retraction. The inability to open and egress from the occupant’s adjacent door presents an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. On June 27, 2024, Fisker filed recall 24V-466 for certain MY 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles. The recall remedy includes an inspection procedure for all four doors and provides replacement of the outer door handle if a “Not Okay” result is found. In view of the recall action being taken by Fisker, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Fisker Ocean 2023
Linked recalls: 24V466000 Component: LATCHES/LOCKS/LINKAGES:DOORS:LATCH
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24005 Preliminary Evaluation

Unintended vehicle movement

Opened: Feb 14, 2024
Closed: Dec 6, 2024

On February 14, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24005 to investigate reports of unintended vehicle movement in model year (MY) 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles manufactured by Fisker Group Inc. The complaints allege the inability to shift into the park gear and/or vehicle rollaway. The investigation found that the subject vehicles contain a logic that prevents the engagement of the park gear when the park gear request is made while the vehicle is still moving at low speeds. In the event the driver requests the park gear prior to the vehicle achieving a complete standstill status, the vehicle rejects the park gear request, displays a visual warning, and shifts into the neutral gear. Therefore, if the driver does not properly restrain the vehicle prior to exiting (i.e., allow the vehicle to come to a complete stop, then provide a second park gear request and/or engage the parking brake), the vehicle is at risk of freely rolling away in neutral. ODI found that existing strategies to deter drivers from exiting the vehicle after failing to ensure the transmission successfully engages the park gear have not stopped some from doing so. The absence of additional mechanisms to mitigate the effects of driver behavior in failing to ensure the park gear was engaged prior to exiting the vehicle constitutes a defect presenting a risk to motor vehicle safety. ODI is aware of one reported injury due to this safety defect. On November 15, 2024, Fisker filed recall 24V-865 for all MY 2023-2024 Fisker Ocean vehicles. The recall remedy is the release of software upgrade OS 2.0. This software update provides additional robustness to prevent unintended vehicle movement via two major changes. First, in the event the driver seatbelt is unlatched when the vehicle is traveling at low speeds, logic was added to initiate an automatic, controlled deceleration to bring the vehicle to a standstill. Once standstill status is achieved, the vehicle will automatically engage the park gear and the electronic parking brake. Second, OS 2.0 introduced an “Auto Vehicle Hold” feature, which holds the vehicle in standstill by maintaining friction brake pressure when the driver removes their foot from the brake pedal. This feature prevents the vehicle from rolling under gravity, which therefore helps engage both the park gear and electronic parking brake. In view of the recall action being taken by Fisker, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Fisker Ocean 2023
Linked recalls: 24V865000 Component: POWER TRAIN:AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed RQ24002 Recall Query

High Voltage Coolant Heater Delamination

Opened: Feb 8, 2024
Closed: May 11, 2026

On January 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received Recall 24V-011 that identified a safety defect in the High Voltage Coolant Heater (HVCH) installed in certain Model Year (MY) 2022-2023 Lucid Air vehicles manufactured prior to July 2022.  The HVCH may experience an internal delamination failure, which poses a risk of the vehicle losing defrost capability.  If the HVCH fails, coolant cannot be heated, and the windshield cannot be defrosted.  Loss of adequate windshield defrost capability could lead to restricted driver field of vision and an increased risk of a crash. The remedy outlined in this recall is a software update that identifies any HVCH failure when it occurs, which then provides a notification on the glass cockpit panel about the lack of defrost capability and advises the owner to contact Lucid for an HVCH replacement.Lucid will then replace the HVCH at no cost to the owner. On July 27th, 2023, Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC filed Recall 23V-518 which affects Jaguar Land Rover vehicles equipped with the same HVCH as the Lucid Vehicles that were supplied by the same supplier (Webasto AG).  Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC’s remedy is to replace the HVCH in the affected vehicles. ODI was concerned that by only providing a notification to drivers that their windshield defroster is not working, Lucid puts the driver in a situation where they could experience the failure during the same drive cycle as they receive the notification.  In this scenario, the driver is not aware they have a failed HVCH until they are operating the vehicle and need the defrost function prior to being able to have the vehicle serviced. ODI opened Recall Query (RQ24002) on February 8, 2024, to assess the adequacy, including the safety consequences, of the remedy described in Lucid’s Recall 24V-011.  ODI received Lucid’s Information Request Response (IRR) to this investigation on April 29, 2024. To date, ODI has not received any complaints regarding the recall remedy outlined in 24V-011. In reviewing Lucid’s IRR data, the percentage of failures after the recall remedy has been implemented on the vehicles is 0.14%.  Of the failures identified by Lucid, none of them described a loss of visibility out the front window.  There was one claim of property damage allegedly due to the recall remedy.  ODI's review of information related to this claim does not indicate a need for further action under this investigation. During the investigation, Lucid clarified that upon the driver receiving the notification their defrost was unavailable, the dashboard message alerts them to use caution if their view is obstructed and to contact customer care.  Upon contacting customer care regarding the dashboard message, a Lucid service member will create a service appointment to have the HVCH replaced.  In instances where the consumer had expressed they do not feel comfortable taking the vehicle into the service center themselves, the service center has offered for the vehicle to be towed. ODI also met with Jaguar Land Rover on November 20, 2024 to review their recall (23V-518) and their reasoning for replacing the HVCH.  Jaguar Land Rover informed ODI that their affected vehicle systems were incapable of detecting an HVCH failure and are unable to warn the driver that the HVCH was starting to fail.This differs from Lucid, which was able to implement a software update to detect and identify a failure to the driver. After analyzing the data submitted in Lucid’s IRR response and reviewing Jaguar Land Rover’s reasoning for its recall remedy, ODI is closing RQ24002 without action. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist.  The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.

Component: VISIBILITY:DEFROSTER/DEFOGGER/HVAC SYSTEM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed EA24001 Engineering Analysis

Loss of steering control

Opened: Feb 1, 2024
Closed: Jun 25, 2026

On July 28, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23014) to investigate instances of loss of electronic power-assisted steering in MY 2023 Tesla Model 3 and MY 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla, Inc. The complaints allege a sudden and unexpected inability to turn the steering wheel or an increase in effort required to turn the steering wheel. These conditions were alleged to occur both during the drive cycle, at various speeds, and at vehicle start up. Consumers reported receiving the warning message “Steering assist reduced” either before, during, or after the loss of steering control, and some consumers described their steering begin to feel “notchy” or “clicky” either prior to or just after the incident. On February 1, 2024, PE23014 was upgraded to EA24001 to further investigate the alleged defect in the affected vehicles. Tesla identified the cause of the increase in steering effort as an overvoltage breakdown (the voltage applied exceeds the maximum design limit), which can overstress motor drive components on the printed circuit board of the vehicle’s steering Electronic Control Unit (ECU). If the primary motor drive components experienced an overvoltage breakdown occurrence while the vehicle was traveling above 0 mph, electronic power-assisted steering would be diverted to secondary motor drive components. The secondary, or backup, motor drive components would maintain electronic power-assisted steering until the vehicle reached 0 mph. If the vehicle was operating on the secondary system and reached 0 mph, the driver would lose electronic power-assisted steering with manual steering remaining available. Only manual steering would remain until the vehicle’s steering ECU is replaced. On February 19, 2025, Tesla filed safety recall 25V092 to address the loss of electronic power-assisted steering. The recall filing documents state that a steering ECU software update, identified as 2023.38.4, was introduced into production vehicles and provided to affected fleet vehicles through an over-the-air (OTA) update beginning in October 2023. The updated software was designed to prevent overvoltage breakdown and overstress of motor drive components on the printed circuit board. ODI’s analysis of related Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and Tesla field data found that complaint traffic declined following the 2023.38.4 software release. In view of the recall action taken by Tesla, ODI is closing this EA. ODI will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the remedy as is consistent with the Agency’s authority and practice.  NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Opening Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 25V092000 Component: STEERING
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE24001 Preliminary Evaluation

Loss of braking performance

Opened: Jan 11, 2024
Closed: Aug 26, 2024

On January 11, 2024, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE24001 to investigate instances of loss of braking performance in model year (MY) 2023 Fisker Ocean vehicles manufactured by Fisker Group Inc. The complaints allege an intermittent partial loss of regenerative braking over low traction surfaces, without alerting the driver. ODI is aware of six minor crashes and one injury due to this failure. The subject vehicles utilize a brake blending feature to achieve deceleration. Upon application of the brake pedal, both the service brake system (friction braking) and regenerative braking system (electric motor negative torque) are applied. Regenerative braking on low friction road surfaces may result in wheel slippage due to the high motor negative torque. The vehicle responds by reducing and/or eliminating regenerative braking torque to reduce wheel slip on drive wheels to maintain vehicle stability and steerability. This reduction in regenerative braking may cause a sensation of loss of braking force (or even vehicle accelerating) that was reported by consumers. Additionally, the driver may experience an unusual/altered brake pedal feel during loss of regenerative braking events, requiring them to press the brake pedal harder to maintain the expected braking rate. Upon exiting the low friction road surface, the regenerative braking force is restored. The initial calibration of the regenerative braking system contained aggressive interventions with a slower recovery in the event of loss of regenerative braking. In November 2023, Fisker launched an Over-the-Air update (OS1.10 SW). This update included a recalibration to reduce regenerative braking torque less aggressively and allow torque recovery to occur more quickly. Based on consumer reports and the data that Fisker provided in response to ODI’s inquiry, OS 1.10 SW reduced, but did not eliminate, the sensation of loss of braking force and resulted in stopping distance performance improvements. Friction braking is always available when the driver presses the brake pedal, and its performance is unaffected by regenerative brake loss. Fisker’s braking system is designed to reach full deceleration even with an unavailable regenerative braking system. The partial loss of braking force during moderate braking events can be overcome by applying additional pressure to the brake pedal to slow or stop the vehicle. On August 20, 2024, Fisker filed recall 24V-623 for all 2023 MY Fisker Ocean vehicles produced for the U.S.A. The recall remedy includes OS 2.2 over-the-air update, which is expected to modify the brake module to enhance the vehicle brake system’s ability to adapt to various driving scenarios. With successful implementation of OS 2.2, a road disturbance will not trigger a reduction in regenerative braking torque. In view of the recall action being taken by Fisker, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Fisker Ocean 2023
Linked recalls: 24V623000 Component: SERVICE BRAKES, ELECTRIC:SOFTWARE/PROGRAMMING
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed RQ23004 Recall Query

High Voltage Battery Contactor Failure

Opened: Aug 17, 2023
Closed: Dec 6, 2023

On August 17, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigations (ODI) opened RQ23-004 to investigate instances of loss of motor power due to overheating high voltage battery contactors in model year (MY) 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles (subject vehicles). This Recall Query (RQ) was opened after receiving 12 consumer complaints alleging a high voltage battery main contactor failure in subject vehicles that were included in Recall 22V-412 and remedied prior to the reported incidents. The remedy in 22V-412 was a Secondary On-Board Diagnostic Control Module (SOBDMC) software update to monitor contactor temperature and reduce battery power to prevent damage to the contactor, and a Battery Energy Control Module (BECM) software update to monitor contactor resistance to identify an overheated contactor and reduce vehicle power to prevent further damage. On October 13, 2023, Ford filed Recall 23V-687 of 34,762 2021-2022 Ford Mustang Mach-E vehicles produced from May 27, 2020 to May 24, 2022 with recalled Bussed Electrical Center parts NK48-10C666-AA, NK48-10C666-BA, or LK98-10C666-AB. Affected vehicles are equipped with the extended range battery. Ford stated that preexisting damage to the contactors caused by heat and accumulated wear may reduce the effectiveness of the software update remedy in 22V-412. The remedy of 23V-687 is to complete a replacement of the Bussed Electrical Center, or High Voltage Battery Junction Box. In addition, Ford stated that subject vehicles equipped with standard range batteries, in comparison to vehicles equipped with extended range batteries, are less at risk of experiencing this failure due to their smaller battery capacity and lower output electric drive motors. In view of the recall action taken by Ford, ODI is closing this investigation. ODI will continue to monitor reports of this failure in both extended range and standard range models. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 23V687000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:PROPULSION SYSTEM:TRACTION BATTERY:MANAGEMENT SYSTEM/ENERGY CONTROL MODULE (BMS/BECM):SOFTWARE
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE23014 Preliminary Evaluation

Loss of steering control

Opened: Jul 28, 2023
Closed: Feb 5, 2024

On July 28, 2023, The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE23-014) after receiving 12 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) reporting loss of steering control in model years (MY) 2023 Tesla Model 3 and Y vehicles. During PE23-014, ODI interviewed complainants, sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla, and convened technical meetings with Tesla that included a joint inspection of a crashed vehicle. The investigation identified 2,388 total complaints regarding the alleged defect, including 124 complaints through VOQs and 2,264 complaints through manufacturer data. ODI is associating 1 crash to this investigation (11544655), where a driver was unable to complete a right hand turn in the intersection and hit a vehicle. This vehicle was subject to a joint inspection by ODI and Tesla. The steering rack was recovered by ODI with the consumer’s permission. ODI’s interviews of allegations supplied to the agency, in the form of VOQs, identified patterns of the incoming complaint traffic. Complaints allege an inability to turn the steering wheel, while other complaints allege an increase in required effort to turn the steering wheel.  These conditions were reported to occur during the drive cycle as well as at start-up.  Approximately one-third of complaints with a reported speed occurred at vehicle start-up or speeds less than 5 mph. Interviews with failures reported at speeds over 5 mph, half reported an inability to turn the steering wheel. A majority of complaints with a reported speed reported between 5 mph and 35 mph with approximately 1 in 10 occurring on open roads at speeds 35 mph and over. The highest reported speed regarding an alleged inability to turn the steering wheel is 75 mph. A majority of allegations reported seeing a warning message, “Steering assist reduced”, either before, during or after the loss of steering control. A portion of drivers described their steering begin to feel “notchy” or “clicky” either prior to or just after the incident. There have been multiple allegations of drivers blocking intersections and/or roadways. ODI is aware of over 50 vehicles which were allegedly towed as a result of the condition from a variety of areas including, driveways, parking lots, side of road and intersections. Multiple complaints state they were able to temporarily remedy the condition by power cycling the vehicle, but the issue reoccurred until the steering rack was replaced. Tesla supplied four steering rack part numbers on the subject vehicles.  The investigation identified part numbers, 1044832-00-A and 1188832-00-A accounted for 2,187 of the complaints and 4 did not have original part number in the information request. ODI has upgraded PE23-014 to an Engineering Analysis (EA24-001) due to continued complaint traffic and to characterize the system conditions leading to- and stemming from- the alleged defect in vehicles supplied with steering rack part numbers 1044832-00-A and 1188832-00-A To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Closed PE23012 Preliminary Evaluation

Loss of Motive Power

Opened: Jul 3, 2023
Closed: Apr 17, 2024

On July 3, 2023, the Office of Defect Investigation (ODI) opened PE23012 to investigate allegations of loss of motor power on model year (MY) 2022 Kia EV6 vehicles. Some consumers reported loss of motor power immediately after warning lamp illumination or reduction of motive power while the vehicle was in motion. This investigation found that the Integrated Charing Unit (ICCU) may become damaged over time from transient high voltage and thermal cycling. A damaged ICCU may not be able to charge the 12-volt battery which can discharge gradually while driving with a reduction of motive power. The vehicle could eventually experience a complete loss of motive power thereby increasing the risk of a crash. On July 13, 2023, Kia conducted a service campaign to inspect the ICCU and install an improved over-current detection software logic in certain 2022-2023 EV6 vehicles. On March 15, 2024, Kia filed recall 24V-200 for 48,232 MY 2022-2024 Kia EV6 vehicles. The recall remedy provides an inspection of the ICCU, and if necessary, a replacement of the ICCU and the associated fuse. The ICCU software reduces the risk of overcurrent and implements voltage peak reduction at the end of EV battery charging. The recall also includes a software update that revises the electric water pump operational threshold to reduce thermal loading during charging and driving. In view of the recall action being taken by Kia, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Kia EV6 2022
Linked recalls: 24V200000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:12V/24V/48V BATTERY
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE23011 Preliminary Evaluation

Loss of Motive Power

Opened: Jun 8, 2023
Closed: Apr 17, 2024

On June 8, 2023, the Office of Defect Investigation (ODI) opened PE23011 to investigate allegations of loss of motor power on model year (MY) 2022 Hyundai Ioniq 5 vehicles. Some consumers reported loss of motor power immediately after a warning lamp illumination or reduction of motive power while the vehicle was in motion. This investigation found that the Integrated Charging Control Unit (ICCU) may be subject to various conditions such as overcurrent, overvoltage induced at the end of charging, and certain thermal loading during operation that can damage its internal components and open the ICCU fuse, resulting in an inability to charge the 12-volt battery. The vehicle could eventually lose all motive power, increasing the risk of a crash. In July 2023, Hyundai issued a service campaign to address certain MY 2022-2023 Ioniq 5 and MY 2023 Ioniq 6 vehicles that may have low 12V auxiliary battery charging occurrences due to an ICCU fault and may set the DTC P1A9096 “DC/DC Converter Input Voltage Sensor Fault”. On March 15, 2024, Hyundai filed Safety Recall 24V-204 for 98,878 MY 2022-2024 Hyundai Ioniq 5 vehicles and MY 2023-2024 Hyundai Ioniq 6, Genesis GV60, Genesis GV70 “Electrified” and Genesis G80 “Electrified” vehicles. The recall remedy provides an inspection, and if necessary, a replacement of the ICCU and the associated fuse. The ICCU software reduces the risk of overcurrent and implements voltage peak reduction at the end of EV battery charging. The recall also includes a software update that revises the electric water pump operational threshold to reduce thermal loading during charging and driving. In view of the recall action being taken by Hyundai, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 24V204000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:12V/24V/48V BATTERY
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed DP23001 Defect Petition

Defect Petition Interlock Request

Opened: Apr 7, 2023
Closed: Mar 18, 2026

On March 21, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) received a petition requesting a “recall of all Tesla cars” produced from 2013 to the date on which the petition was filed due to what Petitioner considers to be the increased likelihood of pedal misapplication. Attached to the Petition is a paper authored by Petitioner. According to Petitioner, the differences in the operator controls between the subject Tesla vehicles and internal combustion engine powered vehicles promote driver pedal misapplication, leading to sudden unintended acceleration (SUA) incidents. To fix this alleged defect, Petitioner argues that the subject vehicles should be equipped with measures that require: (i) occasional removal of the driver’s foot from the pedals; and (ii) application of the brake pedal before fully stopping the vehicle. ODI evaluated the allegations by, among other things, reviewing the Petition and supporting technical paper, and analyzing Tesla’s response to ODI’s Information Request. ODI is denying this Petition. ODI has not found evidence that warrants the opening of a safety defect investigation into the Tesla vehicles as described in the Petition. The use of regenerative braking controlled by the accelerator pedal, or one-pedal driving, is common across most light vehicle manufacturers of electric vehicles and Tesla vehicles are not unique in this respect. Further, ODI identified only a handful of collisions potentially within the scope of the alleged defect; and corresponding vehicle data demonstrated that the subject vehicles responded appropriately to control inputs by their drivers. Moreover, ODI is unaware of any evidence to suggest that Petitioner’s proposed interlock would have prevented alleged SUA events as apparently described in the Petition and supporting materials. Accordingly, the Agency is denying the petition. As with all potential motor vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will continue to review any new information or incidents as they are submitted to the Agency.

Component: UNKNOWN OR OTHER
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE23006 Preliminary Evaluation

Front seat belt anchor detachment

Opened: Mar 24, 2023
Closed: May 16, 2024

On March 24, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) after receiving 2 consumer complaints alleging the front seat belts had suddenly detached from the outboard lap pretensioner anchor while in motion in model year (MY) 2022-2023 Tesla Model X vehicles. In its June 19, 2023 response to ODI’s May 4, 2023 Information Request letter of the PE, Tesla reported that its review of field repair data identified 12 additional warranty claims of the subject condition in the affected vehicles. On July 14, 2023, Tesla filed a safety recall (NHTSA No. 23V-488) of 15,869 MY 2021 - 2023 Tesla Model S and Model X vehicles. The recall remedy is an inspection of the 1st row seat belts for proper connection to the pretensioners. Service personnel will resecure the pretensioners or, if necessary, replace the seat belt retractor assembly. In its recall filing, Tesla stated that effective June 22, 2023, it had updated procedures requiring a first-row seat belt to be disconnected from- and reconnected to- its pretensioner anchor to include additional visual aids to assist technicians and require a pull test-step to confirm that the seat belt was reconnected to the pretensioner anchor to specification. In view of the recall action and process updates taken by Tesla, ODI is closing this PE. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 23V488000 Component: SEAT BELTS:CRITICAL FASTENERS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE23003 Preliminary Evaluation

Steering Wheel Detachment

Opened: Mar 4, 2023
Closed: Apr 24, 2026

On March 4, 2023, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened PE23003 to investigate two reports of steering loss on model year (MY) 2023 Tesla Model Y vehicles due to the detachment of the steering wheel from the steering column while the vehicle was in motion. ODI confirmed from Tesla that in both cases, the vehicles were delivered to the owners missing the retaining bolt (P/N 1036655-00-A) used to secure the steering wheel to a splined shaft on the steering column. Tesla repaired both vehicles under warranty. ODI further learned that both 2023 MY Model Y vehicles had been manufactured in the first week of January 2023 at Tesla’s Austin, TX and Fremont, CA manufacturing facilities, respectively. Both vehicles had received end of production line repairs (rectification) requiring removal and reinstallation of the steering wheel before release from the factory. End of line rectification is an offline process manufacturers use to repair any defects found prior to vehicle release from the factory. It often requires removing and reinstalling unrelated components to access and correct the issue detected during inspections. This service process usually takes place outside the assembly line’s standard quality-control safeguards, introducing the risk of an incomplete or incorrect repair. On April 28, 2023, ODI sent an Information Request letter to Tesla requesting production data and steering wheel detachment reports for all MY 2022 – 2023 Tesla models; numbers of vehicles undergoing end of line steering wheel removals / reinstallations; information about Tesla’s procedures and process controls pertaining to this activity; and Tesla’s assessment of the alleged defect. ODI sent three sets of follow-up questions to Tesla in April, May, and June of 2025 to request a field data update, fleet mileage data, and further information concerning Tesla’s rectification processes and its 2023 internal assessments. ODI’s analysis of Tesla’s submissions and other relevant data revealed that: - No additional related incidents have occurred in either the subject or peer vehicles. - The subject vehicles suffered their steering wheel detachments below 400 miles of service, indicating that any other vehicles experiencing this issue would have already experienced a steering wheel detachment. - ODI identified additional circumstances indicating that rectification taking place outside of January 2023 do not exhibit missing steering wheel fasteners. - After the recognition of both failures, Tesla applied additional controls on vehicles receiving end of line rectification. Since this investigation’s opening, the subject and peer fleet have accumulated an average of 33,000 miles of service with three vehicles reporting under 500 miles and six reporting no mileage, making the likelihoodof any undiscovered missing steering wheel fasteners extremely low. Accordingly, no evidence has been identified to indicate that the alleged defect exists outside the two 2023 incidents that prompted the opening of PE23003, and this PE is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Affected EVs: Tesla Model Y 2023
Component: STEERING:CRITICAL FASTENERS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed DP22005 Defect Petition

Pedestrian alert sounds

Opened: Jan 27, 2023
Closed: Aug 7, 2023

NHTSA received a petition on or about July 18, 2022, requesting that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 141 be applied to all electric and hybrid vehicles operating in the United States. The petition can be reviewed at NHTSA.gov under ODI Number 11486072. FMVSS 141 establishes performance requirements for pedestrian alert sounds for motor vehicles. The standard applies to hybrid and electric vehicles that have a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 KG or less or are defined as low-speed vehicles. The standard became fully applicable to all such vehicles manufactured on or after March 1, 2021.On January 27, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect Petition (DP) 22-005 to evaluate the subject matter described in the petition. On June 24, 2023 and as supplemented on June 25, 2023, the petitioner notified NHTSA he was withdrawing his petition. The petitioner indicated that, based on his review of data, there is no justification for asserting potential benefits that could be derived from actions sought by my petition. Based on the petitioner's withdrawal, DP22-005 is closed. Closure of this DP does not represent a determination by NHTSA regarding the subject matter of the petition.

Linked recalls: 22V063000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:PROPULSION SYSTEM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed EA22002 Engineering Analysis

Autopilot System Driver Controls

Opened: Jun 8, 2022
Closed: Apr 25, 2024

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) upgraded PE21020 to EA22002 on June 8, 2022, to extend work and deepen the PE21020 crash analysis, to supplement that analysis with additional data, and to perform vehicle evaluations to understand how Tesla’s Autopilot system may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver’s supervision. To support this work, ODI collected additional crash information and assessed vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations associated with partial automation via analysis of peer vehicle data and hands-on vehicle evaluation, assessments from NHTSA human factors subject matter experts, and reviews of related publications dedicated to partial driving automation. Autopilot is the simultaneous use of the features that Tesla calls Traffic-Aware Cruise Control (TACC) and Autosteer. TACC is a type of adaptive cruise control that, like traditional cruise control, maintains a set speed but also slows or accelerates as necessary to maintain the vehicle’s following distance from a vehicle in front. As designed, Autosteer detects lane markings and the presence of other nearby vehicles and objects to keep the vehicle in its driving lane. Autopilot is characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 (“L2 system”) partial driving automation system that provides driver assistance through steering, propulsion, and braking within a specified driving environment under direct supervision of the driver. L2 systems should be designed to support the driver’s need to monitor the system in response to the constantly changing driving environment and, if necessary, take over the dynamic driving task. To ensure sufficient driver engagement, vehicles with L2 systems should employ driver engagement systems and usage controls that are appropriate and sufficient for the L2 system design and driver expectations. ODI completed an analysis of 956 crashes reported up to August 30, 2023. In approximately half (489) of those crashes, ODI found: 1.) that there was insufficient data to make an assessment; 2.) the other vehicle was at fault; 3.) Autopilot was found to not be in use; or 4.) the crash was otherwise unrelated to EA22002. Of the remaining 467 crashes, ODI identified trends resulting in three categories: collisions in which the frontal plane of the Tesla struck another vehicle or obstacle with adequate time for an attentive driver to respond to avoid or mitigate the crash (211), roadway departures where Autosteerwas inadvertently disengaged by the driver’s inputs (111), and roadway departures in low traction conditions such as wet roadways (145). ODI observed this pattern across all Tesla models and hardware versions. Crash and human factors assessment showed that Autopilot controls did not sufficiently ensure driver attention and appropriate use. At the same time, peer analysis and vehicle evaluations established that Autopilot invited greater driver confidence via its higher control authority and ease of engagement. This mismatch of weak usage controls and high control authority was evident in these crash categories, which included indications of driver disengagement from the driving task. This mismatch was also evident in roadway departures when the system was engaged in low traction conditions outside of Tesla’s recommendations.Additional information regarding NHTSA’s crash analysis is available in the EA22002 file. ODI reviewed these findings with Tesla during several conversations in Quarter 4 of 2023. On December 12, 2023, Tesla filed a Defect Information Report (DIR) (Recall 23V838) applicable to all Tesla models produced and equipped with any version of its Autopilot system. Tesla’s DIR described the functionality of this system, stated that the prominence and scope of the system’s controls may be insufficient to prevent driver misuse, and described a remedy to improve the effectiveness of driver warnings and to reduce mode confusion. ODI completed an extensive body of work via PE21020 and EA22002, which showed evidence that Tesla’s weak driver engagement system was not appropriate for Autopilot’s permissive operating capabilities. This mismatch resulted in a critical safety gap between drivers’ expectations of the L2 system’s operating capabilities and the system’s true capabilities. This gap led to foreseeable misuse and avoidable crashes. During EA220002, ODI identified at least 13 crashes involving one or more fatalities and many more involving serious injuries, in which foreseeable driver misuse of the system played an apparent role. ODI’s analysis conducted during this investigation, which aligns with Tesla’s conclusion in its Defect Information Report, indicated that in certain circumstances, Autopilot’s system controls and warnings were insufficient for a driver assistance system that requires constant supervision by a human driver. Given Tesla’s recall (23V838) of all vehicles equipped with Autopilot for insufficient controls to prevent misuse, ODI is closing EA22002. Concurrent with that closing, ODI has opened a Recall Query (RQ24009) to assess the effectiveness of the 23V838 remedy. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Linked recalls: 23V085000, 23V838000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE22002 Preliminary Evaluation

Unexpected Brake Activation

Opened: Feb 16, 2022
Closed: Jun 29, 2026

On February 16, 2022, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE22002) to investigate reports of unexpected deceleration while driving with the adaptive cruise control system engaged in Model Year (MY) 2021 – 2022 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles manufactured by Tesla. The subject systems include Autopilot (all versions), Full Self-Driving (FSD) and Traffic Aware Cruise Control (TACC). These complaints have been colloquially referred to as “phantom braking”. ODI opened PE22002 to determine the scope and severity of the potential problem and to assess any resulting safety issues in the subject vehicles. The alleged defect is an unexpected and unrequested vehicle deceleration triggered by the subject system during subject system engagement. The alleged defect does not occur when the subject system is not in use and is separate and distinct from Automated Emergency Braking (AEB). During vehicle operation, AEB is actively monitoring in the subject vehicles regardless of subject system and its intervention is accompanied by audible and visual collision warnings. A Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) trend originating in November 2021 prompted ODI to open PE22002. VOQ narratives reported unexpected brake activation while using TACC, Autopilot or FSD. The trend grew from 99 by the end of 2021 to 314 by February 16, 2022, when PE22002 was opened. ODI sent Information Request (IR) Letters to Tesla on May 4, 2022, and July 11, 2024, to request salient data to quantify vehicle production, field incidents, and the physical parameters of the phantom braking reports. ODI also requested information pertaining to Tesla’s internal assessments, problem resolutions, and their assessment of the alleged defect. Typically, the complaints to ODI and Tesla allege a 10-20 mph speed reduction at highway speeds over a 1-3 second time period.No collisions were identified. Drivers reported seeing no vehicles ahead in the travel lane that would have triggered the deceleration. Many complaints reported the conditions taking place on higher speed roadways in sunny conditions with shadows on the roadway. Complainants typically applied the accelerator to override the unexpected deceleration, and subject vehicles did not come to a complete stop or steer out of their travel lane. ODI analyzed data provided by Tesla in addition to consumer complaints submitted to ODI. Tesla’s complaint and field data exhibited some behavior that aligned with the transition from a radar-vision fusion system to vision-only in mid-2021. VOQ traffic coincided with public events such as Recall 21V846, the opening of PE22002, and several related media publications. In February and March of 2022, Tesla released firmware updates 2022.4.5.1 and 2022.4.5.17 respectively to target aspects of the subject system programming that affect unexpected deceleration. Incident traffic has dissipated substantially in the past years, with 45 incidents reported in 2024, 19 in 2025, and 3 since the beginning of 2026. The conditions reported, while concerning to the drivers, did not alter the vehicle’s lateral positioning in their lanes and did not cause significant loss in distance between the subject and following vehicle to lead to a collision. Complaint traffic to both NHTSA and Tesla reported the same conditions- vehicles traveling with the subject system engaged at higher speeds decelerating suddenly with no commensurate vehicle or obstacle ahead in the same lane. In view of these points, and a low demonstrated hazard to drivers, this Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The Agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances. To review the ODI reports cited in the Closing Resume ODI Report Identification Number document, go to NHTSA.gov.

Component: FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE: ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL:SOFTWARE:SIGNAGE/SIGNAL RECOGNITION
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE21023 Preliminary Evaluation

Tesla Passenger Play

Opened: Dec 21, 2021
Closed: May 26, 2023

The Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-023) on December 21, 2021, to evaluate the driver distraction potential and use frequency / circumstances of in-vehicle game-play functionality referred to as ?Passenger Play? in certain model year (MY) 2017-2022 Tesla Model 3, S, X, and Y vehicles. Distracted driving can result in an increased risk of a crash. PE21-023 was prompted by the receipt of Vehicle Owners Questionnaire (VOQ) 11439598 from the owner of a 2021 Model 3 on November 6, 2021. ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to Tesla on January 20, 2022 and received Tesla?s response on March 4, 2022.On December 24, 2020, Tesla introduced Passenger Play to vehicles equipped with the Intel Atom processor (receiving an aftersale software update) via its 2020 holiday release. Passenger Play permitted occupants to play specific games selected by Tesla for primarily turn-based play style and limited gameplay motion with the transmission in Drive and the vehicle in motion. Under these conditions, a notification would display on the screen and the screen area devoted to the game would reduce from 100% to accommodate vehicle controls and driving task data readout. Specific changes varied among models. On December 21, 2022, Tesla voluntarily disabled Passenger Play capability with Firmware Release 2021.44.25.1 in response to NHTSA?s request. Tesla reported a month later that a 97% completion rate was achieved though Tesla?s Over the Air (OTA) update. ODI opened PE 21-023 to evaluate the driver distraction potential of Tesla Passenger Play while the vehicle is being driven including aspects of the feature, frequency, and use scenarios.Based on the analysis conducted, PE21-023 has been closed. The closing of this investigation does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that no safety-related defect exists. Furthermore, it does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action, if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect exists through additional information the Agency may receive.See attached Closing Report for a detailed summary of the investigation findings.

Component: EQUIPMENT:RECREATIONAL VEHICLE/TRAILER:120/240 VAC ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:RECEPTACLE
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE21020 Preliminary Evaluation

Autopilot & First Responder Scenes

Opened: Aug 13, 2021
Closed: Jun 8, 2022

On August 13, 2021, NHTSA?s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE21-020) to assess the performance of Tesla?s Autopilot system (a system characterized by Tesla as an SAE Level 2 driving automation system designed to support and assist the driver in performing the driving task) available in Tesla vehicles. The investigation opening was motivated by an accumulation of crashes in which Tesla vehicles, operating with Autopilot engaged, struck stationary in-road or roadside first responder vehicles tending to pre-existing collision scenes. Upon opening the investigation, NHTSA indicated that the PE would also evaluate additional similar circumstance crashes of Tesla vehicles operating with Autopilot engaged, as well as assess the technologies and methods used to monitor, assist, and enforce the driver?s engagement with the dynamic driving task during Autopilot operation.PE21-020 is upgraded to an Engineering Analysis (EA) to extend the existing crash analysis, evaluate additional data sets, perform vehicle evaluations, and to explore the degree to which Autopilot and associated Tesla systems may exacerbate human factors or behavioral safety risks by undermining the effectiveness of the driver?s supervision. In doing so, NHTSA plans to continue its assessment of vehicle control authority, driver engagement technologies, and related human factors considerations.The attached Detailed Summary further describes NHTSA?s review to date and the basis for upgrade to an EA.

Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:ADAS
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE21013 Preliminary Evaluation

Loss of Motive Power

Opened: May 17, 2021
Closed: Dec 23, 2021

In May 2021, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) of complaints received alleging a loss of motive power while in motion at any speed with no prior warning to the driver in the 2020-2021 model year (MY) Porsche Taycan electric vehicles. ODI had received 9 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and several field reports. All complaints alleged that a loss of motive power occurred without warning and error messages about a battery fault displayed during or after the vehicle stalled.In the subject vehicles, a pulse-controlled inverter is mounted on each of the two drive modules on the front and rear axles. The software designed to continuously monitor end-to-end communication between the safety-related electronic control units (ECUs) in the vehicle can, in certain instances, incorrectly and sporadically detect a potentially faulty communication, set an error memory entry, and trigger a shutdown of the power train, resulting in loss of motive power. If this occurs, the affected vehicles display the warning message ?Motor control error. Stop vehicle in a safe place in the instrument cluster.Porsche has corrected the software malfunction in production. Further, Porsche is conducting a safety recall (21V-486) to upgrade the software on vehicles already in the field. In view of the recall action, this Preliminary Evaluation is closed. The agency reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by new circumstances.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed online at nhtsa.gov under the following identification numbers: 11435775, 11433960, 11431568, 11429897, 11427688, 11426921, 11426902, 11424618, 11424613, 11424296, 11424175, 11424015, 11423458, 11423311, 11422549, 11422463, 11421593, 11421575, 11421494, 11421347, 11420845, 11420788, 11420734, 11420572, 11419756, 11419735, 11419730, 11419721, 11419422, 11418975, 11418935, 11418793, 11418705, 11418692, 11418593, 11418476, 11418405, 11418381, 11418245, 11418237, 11418153, 11418142, 11418132, 11418106, 11415110, 11414731, 11414486, 11404336, 11386164, 11383427, 11377898, 11377875, 11364083

Linked recalls: 21V486000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗
Closed PE20016 Preliminary Evaluation

Electric Vehicle Battery Fires

Opened: Oct 9, 2020
Closed: Feb 7, 2022

In October 2020, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened a Preliminary Evaluation (PE) on 2017-2020 Model Year (MY) Chevrolet Bolt vehicles based on complaints received alleging that the vehicles caught fire under the seating area while parked and unattended. At the time, ODI had received 2 Vehicle Owner Questionnaires (VOQs) and several field reports. All complaints alleged vehicles caught fire during or after electrical charging.ODI's review found vehicle thermal events occurred during and/or at the end of the battery module charging cycle. The information learned from NHTSA and General Motors joint vehicle inspections prompted General Motors to file Recall 20V-701 on April 29, 2021. The remedy for this recall included 1) performing diagnostic procedures to identify and replace potentially defective battery cell-module assemblies and 2) installing onboard diagnostic software, designed to detect and warn owners regarding potential issues related to changes in battery module performance over time. Until this interim remedy became available for all affected vehicles, General Motors instructed their customers to enable ?Hilltop Reserve or ?Target Charge Level, based on the vehicle-equipped technology. Enabling these technologies would limit charging capacity of the battery module to a maximum of 90 percent. General Motors then continued to investigate the root cause of these battery cell module thermal events, which would lead them to their long-term recall remedy solution. Utilizing the information obtained from the Recall 20V-701 software update, General Motors and LG Energy Solutions,the supplier of the battery cell module pack along with LG Electronics,determined the root cause of the thermal events to be the result of two simultaneous manufacturing defects occurring in the same battery cell. The defect condition appears to be aggravated by routinely charging the battery to a full or nearly full state of charge after it has been substantially depleted. The two defects, located within the same battery cell module, would cause an internal short within the battery pack, resulting in the thermal events. The manufacturing process was changed to prevent the occurrence of these two defect conditions.On July 24, 2021, General Motors filed a defect information report recalling all 2017-2018 Chevrolet Bolt and certain 2019 Chevrolet Bolt vehicles with design level N2.1 battery cell produced at the LG Ochang, Korea plant. This remedy replaces defective battery cell-modules and will prevent potential thermal events from occurring during and/or at the end of the charge cycle. The recall (21V-560) includes vehicles that were remedied under 20V-701.General Motors continued to review new data after Recall 21V-560 and learned of an incident that occurred outside of the scope of the recall population. Additional analysis led General Motors and LGES to determine that the manufacturing defects defined by Recall 21V-560 were not isolated to one battery manufacturing plant. On August 21, 2021, General Motors filed a defect information report to expand the scope of recall 21V-560. The recall (21V-650) includes all 2019-2022 Chevrolet Bolt EV and 2022 Chevrolet Bolt EUV vehicles. In view of the recall actions being taken by General Motors, ODI is closing this Preliminary Evaluation. NHTSA reserves the right to take additional action if warranted by future circumstances.The ODI reports cited above can be reviewed online at nhtsa.gov under the following identification numbers:11230072, 11425524, 11339878, 11365622, 11364692, 11427180, 11429891, 11374956, 11407212, 11372429, 11425225, 11415800

Linked recalls: 21V650000 Component: ELECTRICAL SYSTEM:PROPULSION SYSTEM
Official NHTSA ODI record ↗

Frequently Asked Questions

Understanding NHTSA EV defect investigations

How many NHTSA defect investigations are currently open on electric cars? +

As of NHTSA ODI records through Nov 13, 2026, TrimIndex tracks 11 open federal defect investigations and 29 closed investigations across 37 US electric vehicle models (2020–2026).

What is the difference between a NHTSA PE, EA, RQ, and DP investigation? +

A Preliminary Evaluation (PE) is NHTSA’s initial inquiry into reported safety complaints. An Engineering Analysis (EA) is an escalated, deeper technical investigation that frequently precedes a recall. A Recall Query (RQ) checks whether an existing recall remedy worked, an Audit Query (AQ) reviews manufacturer reporting compliance, and a Defect Petition (DP) evaluates a public request to open an investigation.

Does an open NHTSA investigation mean the EV has a recall? +

Not automatically. An open investigation means NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) is actively gathering data and manufacturer records to determine whether an unreasonable safety risk exists. Some investigations close without a recall while others trigger formal safety recall campaigns.

Can I cite or download this NHTSA EV investigation list? +

Yes. The complete table is downloadable as a CC BY 4.0 CSV directly from this page, with official NHTSA action numbers, opened and closed dates, affected models and direct links to NHTSA ODI records.